[I-1]
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: The Secretary of the Army, 7/20/98
Prepared by COL Woolfolk, ECC, 695-7552
SUBJECT: Report Summary--Operation TAILWIND--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
PURPOSE: To Provide the Results of a Review of Allegations Regarding Operation TAILWIND
DISCUSSION: The Department of the Army conducted research to determine whether the Army used Sarin nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND as directed (Enclosure 1). The Army's report is at Enclosure 2.
Completed research revealed no evidence of use of Sarin chemicals by U.S. forces in Vietnam. No evidence has been found indicating that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army within Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. The Army did have Sarin in weapon storage facilities in Okinawa, Japan, during this time period.
These conclusions are based upon a two-part search for Army documents; the first within the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and the second within all Army organizations that could be expected to be aware of such use of Sarin nerve gas. Interviews were conducted with participants who had personal knowledge of and/or participated in the operation. Finally, specific research regarding the Army's storage and use of Sarin was conducted to provide the exact location of munitions storage.
The Army's costs for researching these allegations are approximately $38,643.00, which includes the 1,795 work hours used to conduct this research and expenditures such as telephone calls. The report will be updated if new evidence is found. The Army's points of contact for compiling this report are Colonel Robert Buckstad, who can be reached telephonically at 703-695-6432 or by email at bucksrd@hqda.army.mil; and Mr. Ed Arnold. at 703-614-0559 or arnolew@hqda.army.mil.
Enclosures
[I-2]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Front Matter
SECDEF Tasking Memo, dated 9 June 98
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army forwarding Memo, dated
10 July 1998
Report Summary- Operation TAILWIND, dated 9 July 1998
TAB A - Document Search Methodology and Results
Archives Search Divider
Army Personnel Command search methodology and resultsArmy Search Divider
Technology Management Office search methodology and resultsNumbered Tab Section
1 - Army Chief of Staff Message DTG 181 700ZJUN98)2 - FORSCOM
3- INSCOM
4 - TRADOC
5 - CNGB
6 - DCSLOG
7 - DCSINT
8- DCSOPS
9 - USASOC
10 - USARPAC
1 1 - AMC
12 - DCSPER
13 - DUSA-IA
14- DAIG
15 - CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY
16 - OTJAG
17 - MTMC
18 - SURGEON GENERAL
19 - USACIC
20 - CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE (AR-PERSCOM)
21 - SAILE-ZX
22 - SAMR
23 - JDIM-MC
24 - SAGC
[I-3]
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Army Search Tasker DividerDCSPER Tasking Message
Army Chief of Staff Tasking Message (DTG 181700ZJUN98)
TAB B - Methodology and Results of Personal Interviews of Individuals
Interview DividerInterview Taskers Divider
TAB C - Methodology and Results of Questions Sent to Army Command and Agencies
Specific QuestionsQuestions Tasker
TAB D - Cost table of Research Effort in support of Operation TAILWIND Document Search
TAB E - DCSLOG Information paper, dated 14 July 1998, on the documents related to an undated/unauthenticated summary of an alleged January 1970 shipment of 2.75" rockets.
TAB F - ODCSPER consolidated response to Army Chief of Staff questions on who had Executive Agent responsibility over Sarin during Operation TAILWIND timeframe, and who had Command and Control of lethal Agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND.
TAB G - Statements provided by individuals to Special Forces Association regarding Operation TAILWIND.
[I-4]
Secretary of Defense Cohen's memorandum of June 9, 1998 on TAILWIND allegations omitted; see Tab B.
[I-5]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
105 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0105
10 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
SUBJECT: Report Summary--Operation TAILWIND
The Department of the Army conducted research to determine whether the Army used Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND as requested. See enclosure 1. This memorandum provides the report. See enclosure 2.
Completed research revealed no evidence of any such use of Sarin. There is no evidence that Sarin Nerve gas was stored by the Army within Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. The Army's costs researching these allegations are approximately $33,708.00 for the 1,710.5 workhours used to conduct this research and expenditures such as telephone calls. The report will be updated if new evidence is found.
These conclusions are based upon (1) a two part document search for Army documents (a) within the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and (b) within all Army organizations that reasonably could be expected to be aware of such use of Sarin Nerve gas, (2) interviews conducted with specific participants in the operation, and (3) specific research regarding the Army's storage and use of Sarin.
The Army points of contact for compiling this report are Colonel Buckstad, who can be reached telephonically at 703-695-6432 and by email at bucksrd@hqda.army.mil; and Mr. Arnold, at 703-614-0559 or amolew@hqda.army.mil.
[Signature]JOEL B. HUDSON
Enclosures
[I-6]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
Operation TAILWIND
Report, 20 July 1998
Contains Information Protected by the Privacy Act
DOI: 20 July 1998
[I-7]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
for
Operation TAILWIND
DOI: 20 July 1998
1. Purpose. This report provides the results of the Department of the Army's review into allegations that Sarin Nerve gas was used during Operation TAILWIND.
2. Conclusion. Research reveals no evidence of any use of Sarin, nor was it a goal of Operation TAILWIND to target U.S. Army defectors. Additionally, there is no evidence that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand.
3. Approach. The Department of the Army's review into the alleged use of Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND focused on three specific research efforts.
a. First, we conducted a search for targeted documents which relate to the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. We searched in the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and within the Army organizations which could be expected to have been involved in any such use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. These searches revealed that there are no existing documents which indicate that the Department of the Army participated in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND.
(1) The Army Declassification Agency did a search of their database using eighteen specific keywords (listed on page 2 of their report, see tab entitled Archives Search). The search identified 132 folders which required additional review. Of these, 130 were at the National Archive's Washington National Record Center (WNRC) (located in Suitland MD) and 2 rolls of microfilm which are at the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks (Carlisle, PA). All folders and microfilm were reviewed. This in-depth review of the contents of each folder and microfilm was NEGATIVE for Operation TAILWIND information.
(2) The Technology Management Office within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army released a message to all Army organizations which could be expected to have documentary evidence of any use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. Each organization was tasked to review their current files area and records holding areas, for all classified and unclassified documents that reference Sarin or TAILWIND during the period 1 Jan '70 and 31 Dec '75. This search resulted in four organizations reporting information pertaining to Sarin - none of which was related to Operation TAILWIND.
[I-8]
DOI: 20 July 1998
(a) The following Army organizations conducted document searches:
U.S. Army Forces Command
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Army Pacific Command
U.S. Army Materiel Command
Military Traffic Management Command
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
National Guard Bureau
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Center for Military History
The Army Judge Advocate General
The Army Inspector General
The Army Surgeon General
Office of the Secretary of the Army
Program Manager, Chemical Demilitarization Office
(b) TAB A contains the results of document searches directed by the Technology Management Office and the Army Declassification Activity.
b. Second, the Center for Military History telephonically interviewed six of seven individuals identified as possibly having firsthand knowledge of Operation TAILWIND and, thus, any use of Sarin Nerve gas. SGT Jay Graves declined to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association. None of the interviewees had personal knowledge of the use of Sarin or any lethal chemical agent during Operation TAILWIND. All stated that the purpose of the mission was to attack installations on the Ho Chi Minh trail and create a diversion for another operation. Adair [one of the individuals interviewed] also stated that there was no mention before or after the mission about defectors or Caucasians in the area of operations. Adair himself saw no Caucasians during the operation except his fellow soldiers. Young [one of the individuals interviewed] saw the gas being sprayed, did not use his damaged mask when the [tear] gas drifted over him, and reported that those who breathed the gas "coughed, choked, but otherwise were not slowed down." Hagen [one of the individuals interviewed] also saw the mist [tear gas] drifting over their position. His mask had a bullet through the filter and when he breathed the gas, "I started throwing up, (and) fell to the ground in convulsions. In discussions with others after the mission, others said that once the effects wear off, you're fine." Schmidt [one of the individuals
[I-9]
DOI: 20 July 1998
interviewed] noted "it was typical to carry masks...it was a normal part of SOG kit." He felt the gas used was stronger than normal tear gas, but "did not hear any rumors to the effect that nerve gas was used on TAILWIND, or that it was ever used on SOG missions." Thus, the interviews conducted reveal that none of the individuals interviewed have any knowledge of the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND.(1) Each interview attempted to gain answers to the following:
(a) Document any information regarding the use of lethal chemical munitions in Vietnam.(b) Identify the exact storage location (base and country) of any lethal chemical munitions known by the interviewee.
(c) Identify the authority empowered to authorize the tactical use of lethal chemical munitions in support of Special Operations Group (SOG) missions.
(d) Identify the name and role of any soldier who might have additional information regarding Operation TAILWIND.
(2) The following lists the individuals who were interviewed:
(a) Individuals interviewed:Name -- Identified as a result ofSGT Minton, FNU -- Provided FAC audio tape from SOCOM archives
MSG Adair, Morris N. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
SGT Young, David L. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
WO1 Watson, William D. -- Referral
SGT Schmidt, Craig -- Early Bird Article
SGT Hagen, Michael E. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
SGT Graves, Jay -- Early Bird Article (Declined to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association.)
(b) At TAB B are the interviewer's recapitulation of these interviews and the Army documents which tasked that the interviews be conducted.
[I-10]
DOI: 20 July 1998
c. Third, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics tasked the Army Materiel Command to provide answers to specific questions raised during internal DoD/Army discussions. We know that during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND, the Army had weapons containing lethal chemical agents stored within the continental United States and in Okinawa. There is no evidence that any lethal chemical agents were released for employment during the time of Operation TAILWIND. Following are the specific research questions:(1 ) What was the quantity of Sarin the US Army controlled then and now?(2) Where were lethal chemical munitions stored during the time of the operation?
(3) In what form was the lethal chemical agent stored (i.e., large drums, or weapons)?
(4) Who managed the custody of the lethal chemical agents? Who had authority to issue lethal chemical agents from the storage sites? Was any ever issued?
TAB C contains the results of the research and the Army documents tasking the research.
d. The Army researched additional issues which arose while developing this report.(1) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DA, analyzed two shipping documents related to an undated summary of an alleged January 1970 shipment of 2.75" rockets. The research revealed that the shipping labels do not conform with marking requirements in place at the time of Operation TAILWIND, for ammunition containing lethal chemical agents. Thus, the presence of the shipping label does not indicate a presence of Sarin. TAB E contains the analysis of these documents.(2) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DA, orchestrated research to determine (a) which DoD agency was the executive agent for lethal chemical agents, and (b) who had command and control of the lethal agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND.
(a) The Center for Military History interviewed MG (Ret) John Hayes, the former Commander, 2nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, where Sarin was stored during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND. According to MG Hayes, the Army was the overall executive agent for the U.S. chemical stockpile at that time. MG Hayes had command and control of the Sarin stockpile in Okinawa during TAILWIND. During his
[I-11]
DOI: 20 July 1998
command, MG Haves never released or approved the release of any lethal chemical agents for use by any U.S. Forces serving in Southeast Asia.(b) TAB F contains the interview notes of MG(Ret) Hayes and other related documents.
4. Costs. It cost the Department of the Army approximately $38,418 and 1,795 workhours to conduct this research. Detailed costs are identified at TAB D.
[I-12]
[Note: None of the tabs listed were provided]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
for
Operation TAILWIND
Annotated Index
DOI: 20 July 1998
Results of searches for Army documents within the................ TAB
A
National Archives' Washington National Record Center
and the Army reveal that there are no existing documents
which indicate that the Department of the Army participated
in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
Results of interviews of individuals who participated ........... TAB B
in or had personal knowledge of Operation TAILWIND
reveal that none of the individuals interviewed have any
knowledge of the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
Results of specific research conducted regarding the ............ TAB
C
types of munitions and chemicals available for use during
the time period of Operation TAILWIND reveals that while
lethal agents were stored as weapons, available Army
documents indicate that no lethal chemicals were stored in
Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand during the timeframe of Operation
TAILWIND (1970).
Detailed costs .................................................. TAB D
Analysis of shipping label and packing document allegedly........ TAB
E
related to a 1970 shipment of unusual weapons to Okinawa,
provided by DoD for Army evaluation.
Interviews of MG (Ret) John Hayes, former Commander, ............ TAB F
2nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, during the TAILWIND period,
confirming command and control of lethal chemical munitions and
disposition of these munitions under his command.
[End Tab I]
[J-1]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000
10 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Secretary of the Navy [Signature John H. Dalton]
Prepared by: Eugene P. Angrist, Acting General Counsel,
614-1994
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding Operation TAILWIND - INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM
PURPOSE: To provide the Secretary of Defense with the Results
of the Department of the Navy's Record Review
Regarding
Operation TAILWIND.
DISCUSSION: On June 9, 1998, the Secretary of Defense directed
the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a review of any
pertinent
sources to determine if the allegations of the use of Sarin gas
on U.S. defectors in Operation TAILWIND were
valid. This review
was the result of a CNN/Time report which aired on June 7, 1998,
and alleged that the U.S. military
used Sarin gas to kill
American defectors during Operation TAILWIND. This review took
thirty days and the results are
contained in the attachment.
There is no evidence, classified or unclassified, that Sarin gas
was used on American
defectors or in any way during Operation
TAILWIND.
Attachment:
1. Department of the Navy Report on Operation TAILWIND, with
attachments.
[J-2]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY REPORT ON
OPERATION TAILWIND
Introduction
On June 9, Secretary Cohen directed the Secretary of the
Navy to conduct a review of military records, historical
writings, other appropriate sources and interview individuals
with personal knowledge of Operation TAILWIND. This order
followed allegations by CNN and Time that Sarin nerve gas was
used to kill U.S. military defectors during this operation. The
Secretary of the Navy directed the General Counsel to conduct
this document search. On June 11, 1998, Acting General Counsel
of the Navy, Eugene P. Angrist, requested the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Director
of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Counsel to
the Commandant, Judge Advocate General of the Navy (JAG) and the
Staff Judge Advocate of the Marine Corps to document any
information to substantiate these allegations (attachment 1).
Overview of Review Process
This review process took 30 days to complete.
Approximately 224 total man-hours were spent searching various
archives for information related to Operation TAILWIND. The
following lists the areas searched:
CNO - Archives of Office of Naval Intelligence (N2), Deputy
CNO (Plans, Policy & Operations)(N3/N5), Deputy CNO
(Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments)(N8),
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Special Warfare
Command (SPECWARCOM), and the Naval Historical Center;
Marine Corps - Command Chronologies, Oral Histories, and
Archived Documents;
NCIS - Defense Clearance and Investigations Index,
automated index of NCIS investigative and adjudicative
files, the Counterintelligence Directorate's Case
Management System, and records in the NCIS Records Center;
JAG - Archives.
LtCol Arthur Picone Jr., USMC, (Ret.), a Marine veteran of
the operation (CH-53D Helicopter Aircraft Commander and Assigned
[J-3]
Alternate Flight Leader During Operation TAILWIND), was located,
questioned and voluntarily submitted a statement in which he
categorically denies the allegation of Sarin use (enclosure 5 of
attachment 2). Also, included is former Marine Corps pilot
Joseph L. Driscoll's statement to Congressman Sam Farr
(attachment 3) denying the use of Sarin gas during the
operation. Mr. Driscoll was a 1st Lieutenant, flying with HML-
367, a squadron of Cobra gunships, which supported Marine H-53
helicopters participating in Operation TAILWIND.
Summary
The Marine Corps produced all the information that the DON
can provide pertinent to this review (attachment 2). All of the
Navy components submitted negative reports (attachment 4). This
is not surprising in light of the fact that this operation
involved Army, Air Force and Marine Corps units only. The
documents provided include: Marine Aircraft Group 16 Command
Chronology for 1-30 September 1970 (EXCERPT); Marine Heavy
Helicopter Squadron 463 Command Chronology for 1-30 September
1970 (EXCERPT); selected message traffic IRT Operation TAILWIND;
Flightcrew Assignment/Debrief Sheets, Operation TAILWIND; in
addition to LtCol Picone's voluntary statement. None of the
information uncovered gives any indication that Sarin gas was
used during these missions.
Discussion
The following is an excerpt from U.S. Marines in Vietnam
1970-1971, pages 295 & 296:
Each month, from May through November, Marine
helicopters took part in SOG lifts, described in HMH-
463 reports as "a tri-Service mission in a denied
access area." These activities reached their climax
in Operation TAILWIND. During this operation, between
7 and 14 September, HMH-463 daily committed five or
six CH-53Ds, eventually supported by four Marine AH-
1Gs, five Army AH1G's or UH-1Es, two Marine and one
Air Force OV-10As, and numerous flights of jets. In
the face of heavy antiaircraft fire, the Marine-led
flights inserted a company-sized SOG force near a
North Vietnamese regiment and then, after the SOG
troops had accomplished their mission, extracted them.
The operation cost HMH-463 two CH-53s shot down and
six crewman wounded, all of whom were rescued.
[J-4]
Although Operation TAILWIND resulted in an
estimated 430 NVA casualties and in the capture of
documents of great intelligence value, it evoked sharp
protests to MACV from Generals McCutcheon and
Armstrong.
The documents discovered by the Marine Corps support this
narrative. "The purpose of the mission," according to Mr.
Driscoll, "was to create a disruption along the North Vietnamese
supply route. The unusually large size of the insertion was to
reacquire the enemy to re-deploy their forces in response."
This is echoed in the MAG-16 Command Chronology excerpt
(enclosure 1 of attachment 2). There is no mention of U.S.
defectors or the use of Sarin gas.
Conclusion
There is no evidence in the Navy and Marine Corps
classified or unclassified official records that would support
the allegation that Sarin gas was employed against U.S.
defectors, or that U.S. defectors were targeted in any way
during Operation TAILWIND. Two Marine Corps pilots who
participated in the operation support this view.
Attachments:
1. Acting General Counsel of the Navy memorandum, dated
June 11, 1998, subj: Allegations Regarding Operation
TAILWIND.
2. HD Comment on SECDEF Memo of 9JUN98, w/enclosures.
3. Letter to Congressman Farr from Joseph L. Driscoll, dated
June 22, 1998.
4. Other Navy Responses.
[End Tab J]
[K-1]
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC
Reply ZIP Code:
203 18-0300
DJSM 775-98
17 July 1 998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
Subject: Report of Operation TAILWIND
Attached is an unclassified version of the memorandum reporting the results of the review directed by the Secretary of Defense
Approved & Secured with Approval
by: DENNIS C. BLAIR, 17 July 1998DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff
Enclosure
[K-2]
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC
Reply ZIP Code:
20318-6000
17 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
Subject: Report of Operation TAILWIND Review
1. This memorandum reports the results of the review conducted in response to the SecDef memorandum, 9 June 1998, "Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind" (Tab A).
2. Conduct of the review:
a. Contact was made with US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all Joint Staff directorates, the Information Management Division (IMD), and the Chairman's Legal and Public Affairs offices. Agencies were tasked to conduct a review IAW with the directive in Secretary Cohen's memorandum. Official files including relevant historical files and retired records were searched. Participating agencies used an estimated 350 man-hours in the conduct of the review.
b. Reviews conducted by the following agencies found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND: J1, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7, J8, and the Legal and Public Affairs offices.
c. The review conducted by USPACOM found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. The review located one document; Annex B, Studies and Observation Group, to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1970, annual history. Since this document is available here, it was not forwarded by USPACOM.
d. The review conducted by USSOCOM found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. The following historical materials (Tab B) relating to TAILWIND accompanied the USSOCOM review report:
[K-3]
(l) Unclassified extract of 1970 MACV-SOG history discussing TAILWIND; it contains no mention of sarin gas or US defectors.
(2) Unclassified extracts from oral history interviews conducted by Dr. Richard Shultz with LTC Lawrence Trapp, LTC Jack Isler, LTC Ernest Hayes, and COL John F. Sadler, retired former members of MACV-SOG, which include discussion of TAILWIND or the use of CS gas.
(3) Tape cassette containing a copy of an alleged recording of Forward Air Controller radio communications during TAILWIND; it was given by SFC Denver Minton, a retired soldier who was on TAILWIND, to the USSOCOM Command Historian, Dr. John Partin. The tape has been furnished to Mr. William A. Davidson, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, for enhancement and review (tape not included at Tab B).
e. The review conducted by DJA found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Since DIA files for the period have been retired to the Washington National Records Center (WNRC), DIA personnel performed a search of electronic databases for raw intelligence reports and finished intelligence retired to the WNRC. Records of six documents apparently originated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were located using the search term "Chavane." These reports were not retained in DIA historical files; report numbers are at Tab C. Agency historian's files and the relevant files of Director's correspondence at the WNRC were searched manually. Mr. Benny Meyer and Mr. Chris Guenther, who served as DIA Southeast Asia analysts in 1970, could not recall any reports regarding defectors or the use of sarin gas.
f. The review conducted by personnel of IMD found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Joint Staff corporate records under the control of the IMD and the Chairman's files (Wheeler files), Record Group 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) were searched.
g. The review conducted by personnel of the Joint History Office found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Phone interviews of former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret) on 17 June1998 and former Director, Joint Staff, Gen John W. Vogt, USAF (Ret) on 18 June 1998 by Dr. Walter Poole revealed no new information
2
[K-4]
(MFR AT Tab D). Admiral Moorer said that he could not remember anything about TAILWIND; he also stated that he had no knowledge of the use of sarin gas or of the targeting of US defectors on TAILWIND. General Vogt had no memory of the use of sarin gas or of the killing of US defectors on TAILWIND. Vogt found the CNN story ~absolutely unbelievable," and he categorically denied having received or issued instructions for the use of sarin gas or for the killing of US defectors.
3. Description of Operation TAILWIND:
a. It is useful to begin with a review of how policies on the use of non-lethal chemical agents were developed between 1965 and 1970. Senior civilian and military officials were constantly attentive to public opinion, carefully defined the conditions for using riot control agents (RCA), and always specified the types of gas authorized for use.
b. In January 1965, without publicity, RCA were used in operations by South Vietnamese personnel who operated dispensers aboard US helicopters. General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) had secured the US Ambassador's political clearance to carry the aerial dispensers. On 20-21 March, Associated Press photographer Horst Faas accompanied South Vietnamese troops in the field and saw them with gas masks and chemical grenades. Faas told AP reporter Peter Arnett who published a story mentioning South Vietnamese "experiments with gas" and non-lethal gas warfare. A public furor followed in the US, which the CJCS characterized as having "literally engulfed the entire government" for two days. The US Ambassador opposed further use of RCA. Westmoreland persuaded the commander of South Vietnamese forces to issue instructions prohibiting the use of RCA on the battlefield.
c. In April 1965, as the first US combat troops entered South Vietnam, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) authorized GEN Westmoreland to employ RCA in accordance with authority granted by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In July, during a background press briefing, the Secretary of Defense said that RCAs would not be used. On 9 September GEN Westmoreland--supported by the Ambassador--requested authority to use RCA for the specific purpose of clearing tunnels, caves, and underground, shelters encountered in tactical operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on 10 September, recommended use of RCA in combat situations, subject only to the judgment of the tactical commander on the scene. On 26 October, the CJCS authorized Westmoreland to
3
[K-5]
employ CN and CS tear gas during a search and clear operation in one village. On 2 November, upon receiving presidential approval, the Chairman granted Westmoreland authority to use CS and CN tear gas at his discretion during military operations in South Vietnam. In practice, delegation of authority usually went to battalion level. Use of nausea producing agents DM and CN-DM was not authorized. The next expansion of authority occurred on 20 January 1968, when the Secretary of Defense approved using CS in Laos during combat air crew recovery operations.
d. During April and May 1969, there were two incidents in which US Marines encountered use of unknown chemical agents by the North Vietnamese; two Marines died. On 25 November 1969, through National Security Decision Memorandum 35, President Richard Nixon reaffirmed US renunciation of first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. He added, however, that this renunciation did not apply to RCA and herbicides.
e. The incursion into Cambodia by US and South Vietnamese forces took place during May and June 1970. To offset the damage inflicted upon supply routes and bases running through Cambodia the enemy sought to expand their control in southern Laos. They undertook to improve passage of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh l~ail by attacking around the Bolovens Plateau to gain control of good dry weather roads and, during the rainy season, a river route into South Vietnam. About 5,000 indigenous personnel were available to disrupt enemy activities in Laos. Authority to use RCA in Cambodia and Laos was requested; it was subsequently granted by the National Command Authorities.
f. Ground operations in Laos had to be covert, so as not to openly violate the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos which forbade the signatories which included the US and North Vietnam from introducing foreign troops or other military personnel in Laos. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (SOG) was permitted to conduct certain types of operations in Laos as authorized by higher authorities in Washington, subject to the concurrence of the US Ambassador in Laos. The chain of command for SOG ran through COMUSMACV in Saigon to CINCPAC in Hawaii and then to the National Command Authorities in Washington.
g. Operation TAILWIND was undertaken for two reasons: to conduct a reconnaissance in force - an offensive operation to contact the enemy, and as a diversion in support of Operation GAUNTLET. TAILWIND was scheduled to begin on 3
4
[K-6]
September, but bad weather delayed it until 11 September. Helicopters inserted three platoons, with 120 indigenous and 16 US personnel, into the Chavane area of southern Laos.
h. The TAILWIND force, inserted under fire on 11 September, was almost constantly in contact with the enemy over the next 72 hours. Later on the 11th, the force discovered and destroyed an ammunition supply dump. On 12 September, the force engaged a platoon and then a company-size element. Tactical air support helped drive the enemy off. The force was heavily engaged throughout 13 September. On 14 September, while moving to the extraction landing zone, the force made contact with the enemy and overran a base camp. The extraction then took place under heavy small arms fire.
i. The script of the post-Tailwind briefing given by 1LT Robert Van Buskirk to GEN Creighton Abrams (COMUSMACV) at Kontum, a copy of which was received from Mr. Rudi Gresham (Tab E), states that (1) on 11 September tactical aircraft used "Rock-Eye" CBU in landing zone preparation and (2) that on 12 and 13 September tactical aircraft used CBU-25 against the enemy and (3) that on 14 September CBU- 19 was used to prepare the area around the extraction landing zone. The briefing script refers to only enemy soldiers being killed during the seizure of a battalion-size camp on 14 September. (Only two US servicemen, Robert Garwood, USMC, and McKinley Nolan, USA, are known to have defected and joined enemy forces during the Vietnam War).
j. At every US military echelon, TAILWIND was rated a success. Friendly losses were three killed (all indigenous) and 49 wounded (including all US ground personnel on TAILWIND); one UH-1G and two CH-53 helicopters crashed. Enemy killed were estimated at 432 ( 288 by air and 144 by ground action). The primary gain from TAILWIND was the capture of documents that constituted the most significant intelligence yet found about the activities of the 559~ Transportation Group. Another benefit was the diversion of enemy forces operating on the Bolovens Plateau. Despite the success of TAILWIND, the effort to reduce the US role in operations and to give indigenous forces an even larger role meant that there was no repetition of TAILWIND.
5
[K-7]
4. Conclusions: Extensive search and review of available records and interviews with ADM Moorer and Gen Vogt have failed to find any material to support the allegations that a military operation in Laos called "Operation TAILWIND" was directed toward US military defectors or that sarin nerve gas was used during the operation.
[Initials V. R., signature]DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Brigadier General, USA (Ret)
Director Joint History Office
[End Tab K]
[L-1]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
15 July 1998
The Honorable William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Pursuant to the direction of the CIA's Executive
Director, we have completed an exhaustive search for any
information regarding the recent media allegations
concerning Operation TAILWIND.
I have been authorized to provide the attached detailed
statement regarding our efforts and results. As stated
therein, the CIA found no information to support the
allegations that the military activity identified as
Operation TAILWIND was intended to take, or in-fact took,
any action against American deserters, or was intended to
employ, or in fact employed, sarin nerve gas. This
unclassified statement may be included in any public report
on this matter which your Department may issue.
You may also wish to note that we have also completed
action on all document referrals made pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) on this subject and have
returned same to your designated FOIA focal point office.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
Lee S. Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Attachment:
as stated
[L-2]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Unclassified Statement
of the
Central Intelligence Agency
regarding "Operation TAILWIND"
The Central Intelligence Agency has now completed an
exhaustive search for any information to support the media
allegations that the United States had used Sarin nerve gas
28 years ago in Laos in a "behind the lines" military action
known as "Operation TAILWIND" and/or that the purpose of
Operation TAILWIND was, at least in part, to locate and kill
American deserters.
The CIA's efforts included thorough searches in the
operational and analytical directorates of the CIA as well
as the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and
our history staff. In addition, knowledgeable civilian and
military personnel, including the senior CIA representatives
in Vientiane (Laos) at that time, were contacted for their
personal recollections.
Although we identified several documents which
contained references to Operation TAILWIND, we found no
information whatsoever to support either of the media
allegations. In addition, none of the individuals contacted
had any knowledge of the use of poison gas either in support
of allied or US military forces or against US deserters.
In conclusion, all records available to the CIA
establish that Operation TAILWIND was exclusively a military
operation which included reconnaissance (e.g., area recon),
monitoring (e.g., roadwatch), and exploitation (e.g.,
document capture or destruction of supplies) activities in
Communist-held areas of Laos. Certainly, a major if not key
objective was to identify and interdict Communist supplies
moving from North Vietnam while a subsidiary objective was
to provide diversionary relief to Laotian irregulars. The
CIA found no information to support the allegations that
Operation TAILWIND was intended to take, or in fact took,
any action against American deserters, or was intended to
employ, or in fact employed, sarin nerve gas.
13 July 1998
[End Tab L]
[M-1]
SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE MELVIN LAIRD
FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
On July 14, 1998, Colonel Thomas G. Bowman, USMCR, spoke with Secretary Laird to discuss Operation Tailwind. Secretary Laird indicated that he had a brief (approximately four minute) conversation with a journalist regarding Operation Tailwind and the use of Sarin gas.
Secretary Laird informed the journalist that he never authorized or was asked to authorize the use of Sarin gas while he was Secretary of Defense (1969-1973). Secretary Laird was aware of the fact that Sarin gas was located on Okinawa. He had no knowledge of Sarin gas being used at any time associated with operations "in theater." "In theater" meant any of the bases and installations in the Pacific area (Guam, Okinawa, etc.) area that were being used to support the Vietnam War. To the best of his knowledge none of the Sarin gas located on Okinawa was ever transported to Vietnam or any other location in Southeast Asia.
During the conversation the journalist read him portions of a transcript of a taped conversation between the journalist and ADM Thomas Moorer, USN, (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding the alleged use of Sarin gas during the Operation Tailwind. As read to him the comments seemed to indicate that ADM Moorer confirmed that Sarin gas was used. When asked for his comment regarding the information from the transcript, Secretary Laird indicated that he thought the allegation regarding the use of Sarin was "...was ridiculous. I met with ADM Moorer every afternoon at about 4:30 to discuss the operations in Vietnam. I have no recollection of him ever speaking to me about authorizing the use of Sarin. I would have had to approve such action."
Secretary Laird closed the conversation indicating that he thought very highly of the Special Forces and was proud of their accomplishments in Vietnam.
[End Tab M]